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Abstract—Malware targeting broadband devices like ADSL
modems, routers and wireless access points is very frequent
in recent days. In this paper, we provide a formal description
of modem malware life cycle. Furthermore, we propose a set
of techniques to perform detailed analysis of infected modem
and we provide the binary samples of modem malware at our
web repository. Description of the modem malware evolution
is also included. Based on our experiences with analysing and
monitoring modem malware, we report on long-term statistics
of modem malware activities in campus network including a
discovery of new botnet. We propose NetFlow based detection
method to reveal the modem malware spreading.
Keywords-modem; malware; botnet; Linux; MIPSel; security;
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I. INTRODUCTION
End-users can protect their computers by many security
tools and local networks can be protected by firewalls, in-
trusion detection and prevention systems. However, there is
still a wide class of broadband devices, as Asymmetric Digital
Subscriber Line (ADSL) modems, with a lack of proper
network protection. Cui et al. [1] found over 540,000 pub-
licly accessible broadband devices, including routers, wireless
access points, modems or VoIP appliances, configured with
factory default root passwords. Broadband devices contain
a lightweight version of regular operating system, e.g., a
BusyBox [2]. Thus, such devices are vulnerable to common
malware and network attacks.
Widely deployed and often misconfigured embedded de-
vices represent serious threat for end-users and even public and
private sector. GNUCITIZEN.org reports on security issues of
various embedded devices. They demonstrated [3] that there
is some kind of security flaw in almost every home electronic
device.
The paper is organised as follows. After the Introduction,
Section II presents an overview of evolution of malware
exploiting broadband devices and a formalisation of modem
malware life cycle. Section III proposes a set of techniques and
methods to perform a detailed analysis of the modem device
infected by malware. Section IV presents statistics from long-
term monitoring of modem malware. Furthermore, description
of malware spreading detection method based on such network
traffic statistics is included. Conclusion summarise possible
usage of techniques described in this paper.
II. MODEM MALWARE
PSYB0T was the first widespread malware directly targeting
modems. It was discovered in 2009 by Australian security
researcher Terry Baume [4]. PSYB0T profited from the fact
that several revisions of the modem firmware was shipped
with insecure web configuration interface available from the
Internet. It means that no username or password was required
to access the configuration interface. Remote access via SSH
and TELNET was enabled with admin password. These
flaws were fixed in later firmware revisions. PSYB0T came
into awareness when it was labelled as an originator of the
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against DroneBL
site [5] in March 2009.
PSYB0T was a proof-of-concept botnet exploiting typical
vulnerabilities and misconfigurations of the modems. It pre-
sented simple and efficient techniques how to exploit flaws of
modem firmware to break into the modems. The botnet was
shot down by the botmaster in late March 2009. In that time
the size of the botnet was estimated about 80–100 thousands
of infected modems.
Another example of the modem malware is dhpot.
It appeared shortly after PSYB0T in early 2009 in
time when PSYB0T was shot down. The worm exe-
cutable contains a string “The Distributed Honeypot
Project“. There is not much information about its activ-
ities [6]. dhpot spreads via TELNET service. We acquired
a dhpot sample from an infected modem in March 2011.
At that time the worm infrastructure was down. Some worm
artifacts were randomly spreading through Internet using last
distribution server. Our dhpot analysis is based on binary file
downloaded from the Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP)
server (2rstt.mooo.com).
Worm does not conduct any attacks. It is used to get
information about infected modem, send it to the server and
spread itself to other devices. dhpot detects a version of
installed operating system, modem uptime, MAC address of
the modem and its IP address. Acquired information together
with login and password, used to break into the modem, are
sent to the server that collects worm statistical information.
dhpot is the only observed modem malware which does not
use Internet Relay Chat (IRC) and downloads files through
FTP or TFTP protocols.
In December 2009 we have discovered previously unknown
malware targeting modems. The Chuck Norris botnet [7] got
its nickname from a comment in its source code [R]anger
Killato : in nome di Chuck Norris !. The bot-
net was disclosed in February 2010 and the activity of the
botnet’s C&C centres was suspended on 22 February 2010.
The estimated size of the botnet was over 30,000 devices in
that time. Ongoing presence of the Chuck Norris botnet was
documented by Marco van Berkum [8] in November 2010.
Description of this improved version can be found in [9].
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Fig. 1. The Chuck Norris botnet life cycle: (1) scanning for vulnerable
devices in selected networks, (2) infection of a vulnerable device, (3) bot
initialisation, (4) further scanning for vulnerable devices from a newly infected
device and waiting for attack commands.
The life cycle of the Chuck Norris botnet can be divided
into the four parts as shown in Figure 1. There can be seen
some common characteristics typical for the most of modem
malware:
Simplicity: In comparison to for example fast flux or
advanced anti-debugging techniques used by PC malware,
modem malware use simple techniques as IRC communication
or Ultimate Packer for eXecutables (UPX) packaging [10].
Ease of Creation: Modem malware is often based on
slightly modified Linux PC malware and cross-compiled for
MIPSel hardware. There are publicly available malware source
codes (Hydra [11], Kaiten [12]) that can be easily modified
and used by any botmaster.
Command and Control: Botmasters use exclusively IRC
protocol to control their botnets from dedicated C&C servers.
Ease of Removing: Modem malware so far resists in a
Random Access Memory (RAM) used by modems as tempo-
rary extension storage. RAM is erased on each reboot of the
device and rewritten by the firmware image from a persistent
Non-Volatile Random Access Memory (NVRAM). Therefore
a power cycling disinfects the modem although it does not
prevent any future infection until a security configuration of
the modem is changed.
Functionality Division: Main tasks of the bots are usu-
ally performed by separated binaries. The first tool performs
scanning of selected networks for other vulnerable modems
and controls spreading via TELNET/SSH. The second tool
(bot) communicates with the C&C centre and performs several
harmful functions like various types of flood attacks or inter-
prets instructions from the C&C centre as shell commands.
Figure 1, describing Chuck Norris botnet life cycle, follows
general scheme of modem malware life cycle described in Al-
gorithm 1. As first operation after intrusion into the device, bot
tries to disable any connection to the configuration interfaces.
Then, the botnet binaries are downloaded and up-to-date bot is
launched. Finally, bot performs orders from C&C centre while
other vulnerable devices are searched for and infected.
Algorithm 1 Modem Botnet Life Cycle
PORT := 23 {TELNET port}
NETS := predefined list of network prefixes
CREDENTIALS := login/password combinations
MODEMS := initially empty set of vulnerable modems
BOT :
daemonize() {go to background}
IRCConnection := IRCConnect(C&C server, IRC channel)
while COMMAND := receiveCommand(IRCConnection) do
if COMMAND == Quit then
break;
end if
performCommand(COMMAND)
end while
BOT − LIFECY CLE:
{Disable connections to a configuration interface(s)}
system (“iptables -I INPUT 1 -p tcp –dport PORT -j DROP”)
{Download bot executable file}
wget http://C&C server/bot
{Start ./bot in background}
BOT
{Scan for vulnerable modems}
for all NET in NETS do
IPS := IP addresses based on NET prefix
for all IP in IPS do
if testConnection (IP on PORT) == OK then
MODEMS := IP {add another vulnerable modem}
end if
end for
end for
{Try to break into vulnerable modems}
for all MODEM in MODEMS do
for all CREDENTIAL in CREDENTIALS do
if login(MODEM , PORT , CREDENTIAL) == OK then
execute BOT − LIFECY CLE at MODEM
end if
end for
end for
III. INFECTED MODEM ANALYSIS
One approach to study malware is to perform analysis of the
infected modem. Through this, we are able to observe botnet
activities and it is possible to detect new C&C server(s) and
distribution site(s). This Section shows analysis which uses
modem built-in commands and can be performed by any user.
A. Remote Access to Modem Administration
Devices with enabled remote access via TELNET, SSH,
or HTTP(S) are potentially vulnerable. To determine modem
public IP address, check from your local network a website
which provides you the IP information1. To check remote
access, use your actual IP address and type commands listed
in example bellow.
# telnet -l admin <<IP>>
# ssh root@<<IP>>
# curl http://<<IP>>
# curl https://<<IP>>
Alternatively, you can access your modem from local net-
work using default IP address, usually 192.168.1.1. Typically,
the firewall policy for local network is less strict than for the
Internet interface. In case you have established the connection,
try default credentials2 for your device to log in. If you
cannot connect, try to power cycle your device to “disinfect” it
before you check the access again. The malware often blocks
connections to TCP ports 22–80 to hide own activities. See
Section III-C how to prevent blocking remote access.
B. Modem Operating System
BusyBox provides a fairly complete environment for any
small or embedded system. It is a multi-call binary that
combines many common Unix utilities into a single exe-
cutable. Nowadays, the BusyBox is used in many Linux-based
modems. Some of the devices provide access to a shell as
shown in example below.
# busybox
BusyBox v0.61.pre (2006.12.15-07:55+0000) multi-call
binary
Usage: busybox [function] [arguments]...
or: [function] [arguments]...
Currently defined functions:
[, ash, busybox, cat, chgrp, chmod, chown, cp,
date, dd, df, echo, false, free, grep, hostname,
id, ifconfig, init, insmod, kill, ln, login, ls,
lsmod, mkdir, modprobe, mount, mv, passwd, ping,
ps, pwd, reboot, rm, rmmod, route, sh, sleep,
sync, tar, test, tftp, touch, true, tty, umount,
wget, whoami, yes
Once the bot gains access to a modem, it will try to
download malware via wget or other download programs like
ftpget or tftp. Other used commands are sh, chmod, ln,
mkdir, and rm. Generally, the modem file system [13] is
read-only. To store files, the RAM-based file system mounted
at /var must be used. Everything in /var will be lost on
device reboot.
# ls -alF /var/* | grep ’*’
-rwxrwxrwx 1 0 0 220326 Sep 29 15:35 hidr*
-rwxr-xr-x 1 0 0 39228 Sep 28 22:00 mzn*
-rwxr-xr-x 1 0 0 53301 Sep 29 21:58 scanzz*
-rwxrwxrwx 1 0 0 41531 Sep 29 15:11 suka*
-rwxr-xr-x 1 0 0 45580 Sep 28 11:22 .z.sh*
1http://www.whatismyip.org
2http://www.routerpasswords.com
To hide malware presence, some bots add dot character in
front of the name of the file or directory, e.g., .scan, or they
use ... as a directory name. Other common technique is
to remove stored binary files, once they are executed. Process
information pseudo-file system still provides information about
executed commands. /proc/*/exe shows process number
of removed file. ps command provides further information
about the running process, including command path.
# ls -la /proc/*/exe | grep var
ls: /proc/7821/exe: No such file or directory
/proc/2593/exe -> /var/tmp/suka
ls: ls:/proc/2617/exe: No such file or directory
/proc/2621/exe -> /var/tmp/mzn
# ps
PID Uid VmSize Stat Command
2621 root 636 S /var/tmp/mzn <- bot client!!
7821 root 644 S -bash <- bot client!!
C. Modem Firewall
The modem may be infected by several botnets simultane-
ously if the TELNET port remains open. Typically, the first
malware operation after gaining access is to set IP table rule
which will block remote connections to TCP ports 22–80.
# iptables -I INPUT 1 -p tcp --dport 22:80 \
-s ! 127.0.0.1 -j DROP
This will effectively block all attempts to remotely remove
or analyse malware inside infected device. To avoid such
situation, a small shell daemon can be used to check firewall
rules and reopen closed TELNET port.
# ( while true; do \
iptables -nL INPUT --line-numbers | \
grep ’1 ’ | grep ACCEPT | grep ’dpt:23’ || \
iptables -I INPUT 1 -p tcp --dport 23 -j ACCEPT;\
sleep 10; \
done ) &
Connection tracking provides information about hosts trying
to connect to the modem administration interface. It can be
network discovery scans or TELNET brute force attacks.
Resulting list of IP addresses can be used to traceback attack
sources.
# while true; do \
cat /proc/net/ip_conntrack | grep ’dport=23 ’ | \
grep CLOSE ; sleep 2; echo -n .; \
done
D. Memory Analysis
Modems do not store any persistent logs which can provide
used shell commands. Physical memory analysis is the only
way how to determine information as malware commands,
distribution sites, IRC messages, etc. Memory stores partial
information even after the reboot. This way, malware artifacts
can be extracted even from the disinfected devices.
The dd program can be used to capture the contents of
physical memory using /dev/mem file. In the recent Linux
kernels, /dev/mem is no longer available by default. On the
other hand, all modems that we analysed provide /dev/mem.
Following command will create image of physical memory and
store it on a remote server.
# dd if=/dev/mem bs=1M | \
ssh user@192.168.1.20 dd of=/tmp/mem-copy.bin
The /proc/iomem shows the map of the system memory
for each physical device. This is important if the system RAM
does not start at address 0. dd is not able to capture memory
without correct offset (starting address).
# cat /proc/iomem
00000000-13ffffff : reserved
14000000-1401ffff : System RAM
14020000-14ffffff : System RAM
14020000-141cb7bf : Kernel code
141dc300-141f7fff : Kernel data
a8610000-a86107ff : eth0
We search for a “wget” pattern to extract botnet distribution
sites from the current content of memory.
# dd if=/dev/mem skip=335544320 bs=1 | grep ’wget’
To extract botnet IRC communication from the actual con-
tents of memory, we search for “PRIVMSG” or “NOTICE”
strings used as IRC user commands.
# dd if=/dev/mem skip=335544320 bs=1 | grep PRIVMSG
# dd if=/dev/mem skip=335544320 bs=1 | grep NOTICE
E. Malware Samples
Malware samples can be downloaded from botnet distri-
bution sites. What to do if they are down or the botmasters
blocked access from malware researchers’ network? In such
case, we must extract the malware samples from infected
device. The modem file upload possibilities are quite limited.
We use hexdump to convert a binary file to hexadecimal
dump which we copy from terminal output and convert them
back to original file.
# cat /var/.scan/m | hexdump -v -e ’"\\\x" 1/1 "%02x"’
# echo -e -n "‘cat terminal_output_file‘" > m
We maintain an archive3 of modem malware samples for
other malware researchers. The archive includes all modem
malware binaries, we describe in this paper.
IV. MALWARE NETWORK ACTIVITIES
To protect our campus network, we have developed and
deployed network monitoring system based on NetFlow in-
formation (see Figure 2). The network-based approach allows
us to see all activities against and from our network. We use
NetFlow [14] as an input for the security analyses and the
anomaly detection systems we work on.
Algorithm 2 describes the method to detect malware spread-
ing. The use of the TELNET protocol should be discontin-
ued for security related shortcomings and replaced by SSH
protocol. Any TELNET activity, especially on the public
Internet, is suspicious. TELNET is the main protocol used to
break into insecure modems. Therefore, we focus on TELNET
connections (TCP port 23). Other conditions to designate a
certain IP address as an attacker are:
3http://dior.ics.muni.cz/∼celeda/malware-samples/
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Fig. 2. Flow-based network security monitoring system. Generated NetFlow
data are stored into NetFlow collectors and used for network forensics by
university security team.
1) A particular flow contains TCP SYN flag only – attacker
only checks for opened TELNET port and do not send
more than one packet to the host.
2) TCP SYN packet size is 60 bytes – the flow length
(corresponding to the single SYN packet in the flow)
of 60 bytes is a fingerprint of Linux TCP/IP stack used
in modems.
Algorithm 2 Malware Spreading Detection
FLOWS := observed flow information
{Select suspicious IP addresses}
for all FLOW in FLOWS do
if FLOW.TCP.dstport == 23 then
if SYN in FLOW.TCP.flags then
if not ACK in FLOW.TCP.flags then
if FLOW.Bytes == 60 then
IPS.add(FLOW.IP.srcaddr)
end if
end if
end if
end if
end for
Here we provide a long term statistics acquired both from
the campus network and from the single host outside the
campus network. These statistics are based on the Algorithm 2.
They were collected in the period from October 2009 till
July 2011 and contain NetFlow data representing TELNET
scans. This behaviour is typical for botnets targeting modems.
Example of such malware is the Chuck Norris botnet, which
was active in the watched period.
Figures 3 and 4 show the number of total scans aggregated
by days in different networks. We can see significantly larger
number of scans targeting campus network. This is caused by
the large address space covered by campus network, containing
B class subnet instead of one particular IP address in the case
of single host statistics.
The number of scans performed by a single attacker corre-
sponds also with this fact. In the case of campus network,
each attacker performed 194 scans in average. It roughly
corresponds to the horizontal scan exploring C class subnet
of the campus network. In the case of host outside campus
network, there was only one scan per attacker in average.
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Figure 3 illustrates how the bots stopped their activity after
botnet disclosure. We released the botnet information to the
security community including TF-CSIRT4 in February 2010.
Afterwards, the botmasters removed our campus network from
their scanning lists. We can see significant decrease in number
of scans in the second half of the year 2010.
Later we have observed blocked access to the botnet dis-
tribution and C&C servers from networks outside the set of
networks scanned by bots. These way botnet owners try to
reduce possibility of studying botnet by security experts.
V. CONCLUSION
As we have demonstrated in the Section IV, there is a
high potential to detect suspicious network activity from the
ISPs point of view. ISPs can start with instructions and
best-practices for managing security situation in the network
described in some Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
documents [15], [16]. According to these documents, ISPs are
supposed to use some combination of malware detection meth-
ods, like network/application traffic flow analysis or Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS), to protect their customers.
4http://www.terena.org/activities/tf-csirt/
In this paper, we have described several techniques to get as
much as possible information about modem malware. With our
experiences from analysing modem malware, we have shown
a general characteristics and behaviour pattern of the current
generation of the modem malware. Furthermore, we also
provide a number of malware samples for other researchers.
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